It Takes Two to Tango: Lobbies and the Political Business Cycle

;

URN urn:nbn:de:gbv:705-opus-20930
URL
Dokumentart: ResearchPaper
Institut 1: Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Wirtschaftspolitik / Prof. Dr. Dluhosch (ehem. PD Dr. Braeuninger)
Institut 2: Volkswirtschaftslehre, insbesondere Finanzwissenschaft / Prof. Dr. Ivanova-Stenzel (ehem. Prof Dr. Zimmermann)
Sprache: Englisch
Erstellungsjahr: 2009
Publikationsdatum:
Bemerkung: Volltextzugang nur innerhalb des Campusnetzes der HSU
Originalveröffentlichung: Diskussionspapier Nr. 98, September 2009 (2009)
Freie Schlagwörter (Englisch): interest groups , political business cycles , growth , unemployment , inflation
DDC-Sachgruppe: Wirtschaft

Kurzfassung auf Englisch:

With interest groups significantly affecting economic performance (according to Mancur Olson) and a vital interest of governments in economic growth and low unemployment in order to win elections, there should be a link between political business cycles and the evolution of lobbies over time which has totally been ignored in the literature up to now. In modeling this link in a theoretical and empirical way we try to answer two questions: Is it possible to interpret Olson´s Law of Interest Groups not only as a long run phenomenon but also in a short-run perspective, integrating it into the theory of political business cycles? And: is there any empirical evidence that a typical pattern of lobby behavior and macroeconomic status exists which is consistent over a couple of election periods? In order to investigate these issues, we first analyze some literature that is usually ignored in the more technical contributions evaluating Olson´s law, but proves to be highly important as background for answering the above mentioned questions. We then illustrate how a model consisting of Olson´s interest-groups theory and the endeavors of governments to win the majority of votes in elections could look like, before we perform a time-series-analysis based on the lobby-list of the German Bundestag in order to gain some more insights into the relationships between lobbies, governments and voters. As a result we discover a consistent behavior of the lobbies over the cycle that boils down to some kind of non-aggression pact between the lobbies and the governments irrespective of their political alignments.

Hinweis zum Urheberrecht

Für Dokumente, die in elektronischer Form über Datenenetze angeboten werden, gilt uneingeschränkt das Urheberrechtsgesetz (UrhG). Insbesondere gilt:

Einzelne Vervielfältigungen, z.B. Kopien und Ausdrucke, dürfen nur zum privaten und sonstigen eigenen Gebrauch angefertigt werden (Paragraph 53 Urheberrecht). Die Herstellung und Verbreitung von weiteren Reproduktionen ist nur mit ausdrücklicher Genehmigung des Urhebers gestattet.

Der Benutzer ist für die Einhaltung der Rechtsvorschriften selbst verantwortlich und kann bei Mißbrauch haftbar gemacht werden.